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Introduction 
This article addresses several recent exercises in direct democracy at a state and sub-state level 
across Europe, each of which poses challenges to the European Union in different ways. Its 
focus is on referendums that have been held on an internal constitutional issue but which have 
a significant European dimension, and in this way it adds a new perspective to the rich and 
increasingly important body of research and debates on referendums and the EU.1 The EU 
project is often cast in temporal terms as a move forward from a ‘statist’ vision of Europe 
towards a ‘post-sovereign’ reality. Certainly, the trajectory of the EU has been towards 
institutional integration and a diminution of the sovereign prerogatives of Member States. But 
far from offering a new vision of demotic diversity, the EU has in recent times engaged in an 
increasing process of centralisation which, for critics, does not sufficiently take into account 
Europe’s rich plurinational reality. The dramatic proliferation of the referendum across Europe 
has served to expose how strong national identities remain both at state and sub-state level and 
has at times also impeded efforts to achieve closer integration within the EU. The failure of the 
draft Constitutional Treaty in 2005 following rejections of it in referendums held by France 
and the Netherlands was a shock to the system, while the Brexit referendum result in 2016 was, 
at least in part, the culmination of growing disaffection within the UK with the pace of EU 
polity-building.  
Referendum democracy is a growing feature of constitutional politics in Europe. We see this 
when we reflect that of the first 15 states to form or join the European Communities/Union 
only Denmark and Ireland used referendums as part of the ratification process, whereas, of the 
ten states that acceded in 2004, only Cyprus did not. In addition, the recent experience of 
referendums poses a series of challenges to the elite-driven model of EU politics, to its 
centralising telos and to its narrow approach to national identity, which offers no meaningful 
space for demotic multiplicity below the level of the state. In order to further explore the 
relationship between direct democracy and the European project, this article assesses three 
recent national referendums (or referendum processes) focusing prima facie on an internal 
constitutional issue: those held in Greece, Scotland and Catalonia. At the same, each of these 
referendums had a significant European dimension. As will be highlighted, because of this 
                                                          
1 Indicatively, F. Mendez, M. Mendez and V. Triga, Referendums and the European Union: A Comparative 
Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); S. Hobolt, Europe in Question: Referendums on 
European Integration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).   
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European dimension, these referendums, each in its own way, pose challenges to the demotic 
certainties at the heart of the European project.2 
The Greek ‘bailout’ referendum in July 2015 took place at the peak of the debt crisis and was 
viewed as a challenge to the pressures placed upon Greece by the austerity measures imposed 
by its creditors, the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. The issue of how Greece could build a path to economic recovery from an 
unprecedented financial crisis, led to intense political disagreement between the Greek 
government and the creditors. After an impasse in the negotiations, Greek Prime Minister 
Alexis Tsipras announced that the two most recent proposals by the creditors outlining the 
conditions to be met in exchange for financial assistance, were to be approved or rejected by 
the Greek people through a referendum. The resort to the referendum was an attempt by a 
national demos to turn the democratic tables upon the imposition of austerity measures  
perceived as undemocratic and authoritarian, but can also be seen as a challenge to the EU and 
the Eurozone policies. As we will explore in the article, it is notable just how involved key EU 
actors were in trying to procure a result favourable to the European project, attempting to 
subvert a discrete constitutional moment for the Greek people.  
The paper also examines how direct democracy below the level of the state poses its own 
challenges. We address the independence referendum in Scotland, in 2014 and the build-up to 
what was designed to be the Catalan referendum on independence on 1 October 2017, a project 
that has met with strong and ongoing resistance from the Spanish state. The Catalan 
independence referendum process originated from a disagreement over the scope and limits 
that the Spanish constitutional framework provided for Catalan autonomy and its recognition 
of its status as a minority nation, including the constitutional principle of democracy and the 
options for direct democratic participation.  The failure to reach an agreement that could enable 
a negotiated referendum led to proposals for holding a unilateral independence referendum for 
Catalonia on 1st October 2017. Despite the Spanish authorities’ attempt to stop it, the vote went 
ahead in many polling stations, leading to a standoff between both orders of government, and 
to the suspension of Catalan autonomy.  
The Scottish referendum on independence on 18 September 2014 was much less controversial. 
It was staged by the Scottish Government by way of framework legislation passed by the 
Scottish Parliament. Crucially, this was with the consent of the UK Parliament which ceded 
the lawful authority to the Scottish Parliament to hold the referendum and undertook to respect 
the result.3 
The challenges for the EU posed by the latter two processes were very different from that 
presented by Greece: both Catalan and Scottish nationalists see EU membership as key to their 
‘state’ strategies. In addition, the Catalan authorities sought the assistance of the EU Institutions 
                                                          
2 The article, therefore, does not examine referendums where the implementation of a European-wide policy was 
challenged at the domestic level through a referendum. 
3 ‘Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland (the Edinburgh Agreement)’, Edinburgh, 15 October 2012 available at 
https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20170701045319/http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/co
ncordats/Referendum-on-independence visited November 3rd 2017.  
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and of the EU legal framework to enable their referendum to go ahead. Nonetheless, the tacit 
or implicit hostility displayed by the EU towards these expressions of sub-state nationalism, 
particularly in the case of Catalonia, highlights the extent to which the EU is itself wedded to 
a dualistic vision of the Union as a binary relationship between the EU as a supranational 
project on the one hand, and the nation state on the other. But all three referendums are indeed 
challenges to the EU’s centralising project. Just as the Greek referendum4 challenged the 
Union’s self-confidence about the inevitability of the shift in power from the nation-state to the 
EU, so too the resilience of sub-state nationalism, albeit for now at least taking on a decidedly 
pro-EU strategy, serves to highlight the ongoing resilience of vernacular identities and the 
lengths people and peoples will go to build polities that reflect the national aspirations of their 
own societies.  
In its assessment of these national state or sub-state referendums, and after a brief section on 
the challenges posed by the rise of the use of referendums in Europe, the article considers the 
following matters in turn: the demos issue raised by the referendums, the issues of legality and 
interdependence that emerged in relation to each of these exercises of direct democracy and 
the extent to which the EU itself attempted to influence internal domestic constitutional 
processes. In doing so we reflect upon the resilience of constituent power and what these 
examples of direct democracy at the state and sub-state level have to say about the current state 
of EU integration.  
The rise of the use of referendums and the challenges for the EU  
In recent years, the use of referendums has proliferated remarkably across the world, in a trend 
that shows no evidence of waning.5 Due to the changing dynamics of contemporary 
representative government, citizens are increasingly looking to new and often more direct 
forms of political engagement and participation and the referendum has emerged as the obvious 
vehicle for popular decision-making. The proliferation in the use of referendums has been 
significant for the EU, most obviously in processes of accession and treaty revision. More 
recently, we are witnessing the growth of referendums which focus on a specific policy or 
decision adopted by the EU within its sphere of action. Examples of this are the Dutch 
Referendum on the ratification of EU-Ukraine Agreement and the Hungarian Referendum on 
the EU decisions to introduce agreed mandatory refugee allocation quota, both held in 2016. 
These represent a new type of referendum and potentially herald a new phase in the deployment 
of referendums in EU matters. The UK’s recent ‘Brexit’ referendum is also the first case of a 
Member State holding a referendum on leaving the Union.  
Furthermore, the progressive expansion of the EU’s sphere of action is leading to the growing 
interdependence between the legal orders of the EU and its Member States, and therefore in 
many cases the use of referendums by Member States in seemingly domestic matters will have 
                                                          
4 While the Greek referendum, and the referendum outcome, challenged EU economic integration, the Greek 
government ultimately capitulated and accepted the conditions imposed by the creditors in exchange for access to 
bailout funds. 
5 S. Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Democratic Deliberation (Oxford 
University Press 2012) p. 11. F. Mendez, M. Mendez and V .Triga, Referendums and the European Union: A 
Comparative Inquiry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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consequences for, and involve the application of, EU law. These will be the specific focus of 
this article. In these cases, as a result of the significant EU dimension of the matter to be 
decided, different sides in the debate may call on individuals to vote as either national (or sub-
state national) citizens or as EU citizens, with different consequences resulting from the 
conferring of primacy on each of these identities. If the primacy is placed on the EU identity 
of the voters, this may also imply an expectation that the wider EU demos, and therefore the 
other Member States and the EU institutions, will accept or view the decision adopted 
favourably and as compatible with the European project. On the other hand, and from the EU’s 
perspective, these cases will often put the EU Institutions’ responses in the spotlight and 
generate tensions between the general principle of the EU’s non-intervention in internal matters 
of its Member States and its desire to protect its own general interest in relation to the outcome 
of the decision subject to referendum. As we will highlight in our analysis, albeit initially 
framed at an internal state or sub-state level, these referendums also raise many of the issues 
that are central to the current debates on direct democracy and the EU.  
More generally, the EU and its Member States are currently facing serious internal and external 
challenges, which make demotic fissures even more threatening. These include, among others, 
the EU’s longstanding weak democratic status,6 the Eurozone crisis and different approaches 
to austerity,7 the pressures of migration, the rise of sub-state nationalism and the growth of 
Russia as a regional power. It is perceived within the EU that a collective response to these 
challenges, whether initially framed at a sub-state, state or EU level, will require some degree 
of further cooperation or integration. However, the institutional scope to foster EU-wide citizen 
deliberation - debating and contesting the EU’s responses to these challenges and the direction 
of EU integration - is weak. Instead, the Member State referendum fills the gap and in doing 
so, rather than opening a space within which Europeanisation is likely to grow, instead offers 
one of the clearest and most direct instruments for contesting EU policies and decisions and 
for entrenching state-based popular attachments.8 It is in the context of this changing landscape 
that we will analyse the implications of some of the most significant state and sub-state 
referendums held recently in the European sphere.  
 
I. Definition of the demos 
In the cases of Greece, Scotland and Catalonia, despite the exercise in direct democracy 
focusing upon an ‘internal constitutional issue’, the EU dimension was central to the 
                                                          
6 See indicatively F. Decker, ‘Governance beyond the nation-state. Reflections on the democratic deficit of the 
European Union’, 9 Journal of European Public Policy (2002) p.256; Myrto Tsakatika, ‘Governance vs. politics: 
the European Union's constitutive ‘democratic deficit’, 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2009) p. 867. 
7 F. Fabbrini, ‘Austerity, the European Council, and the Institutional Future of the European Union: A Proposal 
to Strengthen the Presidency of the European Council’ 22 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2015) p.269; 
J. Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), M. Salomon, ‘Of 
Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions' 21 European Law Journal (2015) p. 521. 
8 F. Mendez and M. Mendez, Referendums on EU Matters (European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal 
Policies, Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2017) available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/571402/IPOL_STU(2017)571402_EN.pdf visited 3 
November 2017 p.51.  
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constitutional debate, engaging as it did wider questions that are central to the future of the 
European project. The first of these is the identity of the demos.    
A tension between the resilience of national demoi within the Member States and the incipient 
demos of the European Union has been an ongoing aspect of the use of referendums in relation 
to the integration process.  Treaty revision referendums have become vehicles to articulate and 
empower national identities and in some cases voters have used them to vent frustrations with 
the broader constitutional trajectory of the European Union.9 In this sense, these referendums 
have been criticised from an EU perspective as undemocratic, because they allow the people 
of a single Member State to block the development of EU integration for the rest of the peoples 
of the EU. However, they can also be seen as part of a continuous process of multilevel 
deliberation on the EU integration process, involving citizens, governments at the national 
level, and the EU institutions.10 If seen in this way, they are a reflection of the complexity of 
the development of constitutionalism in the EU and of some form of pan-European public. We 
also see the complex interconnection between different levels of demotic identity in the three 
main cases considered in this paper, even though the issue to be decided in each, unlike 
referendums dealing explicitly with European integration, was prima facie a domestic one. As 
this section will illustrate, different understandings of the scope and significance of 
membership of the EU can arise even in such referendums on seemingly internal matters.  
In the Greek referendum, the underlying issue related to the appropriate economic path Greece 
should follow to recover from the debt crisis, namely whether it should accept the austerity 
proposed by its creditors or not. Inevitably, Greece’s participation to the Eurozone meant that 
a seemingly internal matter (shaping internal economic policy to overcome a debt crisis), had 
a significant European dimension. The government and parties campaigning against the 
proposed austerity measures (the ‘No’ side), presented the referendum as an opportunity for 
Greece to regain economic sovereignty,11 and for the Greek people to have the power to 
democratically determine their own economic future.12 The campaign highlighted that during 
bailout negotiations, the creditors had failed to treat the Greek delegation “as an equal and 
sovereign partner in negotiations”.13 Therefore, for the ‘No’ side, a resounding rejection of the 
creditors’ proposals would allow the Greek people to regain their voice in a negotiating process 
that was faulted for being exclusionary, undemocratic, and overly technocratic. The arguments 
employed (“No to subjugation, No to the new occupation”),14 sought to invoke and bolster the 
Greek, rather than the European, identity of the electorate in order to repudiate what were 
presented as the transgressions of the creditors. 
In a swift response, Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, 
highlighted that the referendum had repercussions that would go beyond the interests of the 
                                                          
9 Tierney, supra n.5, p. 164. 
10 Tierney, supra n. 5, p. 164. 
11 V. Triga and V. Manavopoulos, ‘The Greek bailout referendum of 2015’, in Mendez and Mendez (2017), supra 
n.8, p. 135. 
12 The real reasons Prime Minister Tsipras sought a referendum at that point in the negotiation process are 
contested and unclear. 
13 Triga and Manavopoulos, supra n.11, p 135. 
14 Triga and Manavopoulos, supra n.11, p 134. 
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Greek people. Juncker framed the government’s decision to call a referendum as a “self-
interested”15 one driven by populism and tactical gamesmanship.  As he stressed “playing one 
democracy against 18 others is not an attitude worthy of the great Greek nation”.16 This 
according to Juncker gave the Greek electorate a dual responsibility in the referendum. Juncker 
asked voters to be aware of “the national and European role they are playing”17 when voting. 
He stressed how the “other Eurozone Member States have gone to great lengths to 
accommodate Greece”18 and connected a referendum outcome rejecting the proposals to “the 
Greek people letting down the European Union”.19 Thus, for Europe, the scope of the question 
posed in the referendum was different. It was not meant to determine the appropriate economic 
policies that should be adopted to ensure Greece’s economic recovery, but instead, it 
represented a yes/no to the broader project of European economic integration. In this regard, 
Juncker highlighted the need for a Europe that “seek[s] the common interest” and is not “a 
stage of confrontations between national interests”.20 This approach asserted the primacy of the 
European identity of the voters, essentially asking them to vote not as Greeks, but as Europeans. 
It also suggested to the Greek people, that the referendum was far from being a “sovereign act, 
self-contained within the state”.21 It was instead, a thinly veiled referendum on supranational 
integration, which represented a clear “contest between an internal conceptualization of 
sovereignty”22 (this was promoted by the ‘No’ side and related to the sovereignty of Greece to 
determine its own fiscal policy), against an “external conceptualisation”23 of sovereignty 
whereby the EU increasingly was asserting its position as the “incipient sovereign”24 that 
should have the authority to determine a solution to the economic crisis that would be palatable 
to all Eurozone members. The latter approach was the key feature of the ‘Yes’ campaign in the 
referendum. The campaign suggested unequivocally that “the electorate should vote as if they 
were voting for the country’s participation in the Eurozone”.25 
                                                          
15 ‘Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker’s press conference on Greece’ European Commission Press 
Release Database, 29 June 2015, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm>, visited 3 
November 2017.  
16 --, ‘Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker’s press conference on Greece’ European Commission Press 
Release Database, 29 June 2015, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm>, visited 3 
November 2017.  
17 --, ‘Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker’s press conference on Greece’ European Commission Press 
Release Database, 29 June 2015, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm>, visited 3 
November 2017.  
18 --, ‘Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker’s press conference on Greece’ European Commission Press 
Release Database, 29 June 2015, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm>, visited 3 
November 2017.  
19 --, ‘Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker’s press conference on Greece’ European Commission Press 
Release Database, 29 June 2015, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm>, visited 3 
November 2017.  
20 --, ‘Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker’s press conference on Greece’ European Commission Press 
Release Database, 29 June 2015, <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm>, visited 3 
November 2017.  
21 Tierney, supra n.5, p. 154. 
22 Tierney, supra n.5, p. 155. 
23 Tierney, supra n.5, p. 155. 
24 Tierney, supra n.5, p. 155. 
25 Triga and Manavopoulos, supra n.11, p. 131. 
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Interestingly, the cases of the sub-state referendum processes in Catalonia and Scotland stand 
out from other EU-related referendums because of their pro-European approach. In both cases, 
it was the pro-independence Scottish and Catalan governments that stressed the duality of the 
demos, and which positioned Scottish/Catalan citizens as European citizens. This was an effort 
to emphasise a vision of European citizenship and of the European demos as something that 
was more than merely contingent upon Scotland and Catalonia remaining part of the UK and 
Spain respectively, and which would therefore endure even in the event of independence. In 
the Catalan case this understanding of forming part of a wider European demos has also led to 
an understanding that the Member States and the European institutions have a duty in relation 
to the citizens of Catalonia, as European citizens, and their desire to hold a democratic 
referendum on their future within the EU. In contrast, it was the UK and Spanish governments, 
largely supported by the rest of Member States and EU institutions, which insisted on a much 
more limited understanding of the role of European citizenship: one entirely conditional upon 
the Member State. In acceding to this narrow construction of the origins of EU citizenship the 
EU was perhaps implicitly conceding that in demotic terms it is as yet no greater than the sum 
of its parts. 
The question of the definition of the demos was one of the most contested in the lead up to the 
Catalan referendum in October 2017. One of the main reasons for the refusal of the Spanish 
authorities to engage with the process or to allow the referendum to go ahead was a rejection 
of the very existence of a ‘Catalan people’ with a right to decide unilaterally on their 
constitutional future. This fundamental disagreement on whether Spain contained plural demoi 
manifested itself in the different interpretation by the Catalan and Spanish orders of 
government of the constitutional provisions that refer to ‘national sovereignty’, the 
‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish people’ and ‘the right to self-government of the nationalities 
and regions’.26  
It is notable that the Catalan government, rather than falling back upon generic public 
international law principles of self-determination, in fact tried to frame their demotic claims, 
and the salience of these in interpreting the Spanish constitution, by reference to the EU, 
seeking to make use of relevant aspects of EU principles to bring in the EU institutions as 
intermediaries between Catalonia and the central state.27 The framing of the referendum as a 
European-wide issue occurred first in terms of the political focus of the campaign. This can be 
seen in the initial street marches, with the main banner of the march held on the 11th September 
2012 reading: ‘Catalonia, new state of Europe’.28 The message of the pro-independence 
movement was very clear: they wanted to break away from the Spanish state but strengthen 
                                                          
26 Arts. 1 and 2 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978. 
27 See Parliament of Catalonia, (2013), ‘Resolució 5/X del Parlament de Catalunya, per la qual s’aprova la 
Declaració de sobirania i del dret a decider del poble de Catalunya’. The declaration makes specific reference to 
defending and promoting ‘the founding principles of the European Union particularly the fundamental rights of 
its citizens, democracy, the commitment to the welfare state, solidarity with the different nations of Europe, and 
to economic, social and cultural progress’.  
28 Salvatierra, I. (2012), ‘L’ANC vol una manifestacio massiva l’11-S i adverteix que la pancarta ‘’que compta’’ 
es ‘Catalunya, nou Estat d’Europa’ [The ANC wants a massiva march on the 11th September and warns that the 
banner ‘that counts’ is ‘Catalonia, new state of Europe],  http://www.ara.cat/especials/onze_de_setembre-
ANC_0_768523223.html, visited 7 November 2017.  
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their links with the rest of the European Union by acceding to full statehood and participating 
as an equal with other Member States in all EU institutions, bodies and processes. The 
European focus of the referendum process can also be seen in the Catalan Parliament’s initial 
Resolutions, firstly urging the Catalan Government, political forces and social and economic 
agents to build the maximum consensus ‘in dialogue with the international community, the 
European Union and the Spanish government’; 29 and secondly, in the adoption of the 
‘Declaration of Sovereignty and the Right to Decide of the people of Catalonia’, where 
‘Europeanism’ was included as one of the main principles for the process, stating that ‘The 
founding principles of the European Union will be defended and promoted, particularly the 
fundamental rights of citizens, democracy, the commitment to the welfare state and solidarity 
among the various peoples of Europe (…)’.30  The Catalan Parliament therefore not only 
framed the referendum as a European-wide issue, but made explicit reference to EU principles 
in facilitating the process and providing a more flexible and accommodating legal framework, 
which would be more responsive to Catalan demands.   
The Catalan Government also appealed directly to the EU Member States and institutions for 
assistance, and for them to act as mediators between themselves and the Spanish authorities in 
order to enable the referendum to go ahead. In 2014, the Catalan President, Artur Mas, sent 
letters to the heads of state and government of the 27 EU Member States and to the EU 
Commission, asking for support for a ‘peaceful, democratic transparent and European 
process’.31 In 2017 the new Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont, was more emphatic in a 
speech given at the European Parliament building leading up to the referendum, arguing that 
the Catalan conflict is “a European problem -and Europe cannot look the other way”; “Europe” 
he insisted, “should be part of the solution”.32 He and other important political figures in 
Catalonia, such as the Mayor of Barcelona, called again on the EU to intervene in the conflict 
after the significant use of force by the Spanish riot police against Catalan and therefore 
European citizens on the day of the vote, the suspension of Catalan self-government and the 
imprisonment of the main Catalan political leaders.33   
On the other hand, the proposals for a Catalan independence referendum were also 
characterised as an affront to the values of the EU and to the process of European integration. 
The best-known exponent of this argument is Joseph Weiler, but the Spanish Prime Minister, 
                                                          
29  Parliament of Catalonia, (2012) ‘Resolució 742/IX del Parlament de Catalunya, sobre l’orientació política 
general del Govern’.  
30 Parliament of Catalonia, (2013), ‘Resolució 5/X del Parlament de Catalunya, per la qual s’aprova la Declaració 
de sobirania i del dret a decider del poble de Catalunya’.  
31 Ara, (2014), ‘Mas demana en una carta als líders europeus suport a la consulta’ [Mas asks for the support of 
European leaders in letter], http://www.ara.cat/politica/Mas-liders-europeus-suport-
consulta_0_1058894222.html, visited 7 November 2017.  
32 --, ‘Puigdemont: “Europe cannot look the other way”, Catalan News Agency, 25 January 2017 
www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/puigdemont-europe-cannot-look-the-other-way, visited 3 November 
2017.  
33 S. Jones and S. Burgen, ‘Catalan leader calls for mediation with Spain over independence’, The Guardian, 2 
October 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/02/catalan-government-emergency-meeting-spain-
independence, visited 3 November 2017 and C. Camps, ‘Barcelona mayor proposes EU dialogue platform on 
Catalan conflict’, El Nacional, 5 October 2017, www.elnacional.cat/en/news/colau-dialogue-platform-eu-
catalonia_199119_102.html , visited 3 November 2017. 
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Mariano Rajoy, and members of the Spanish Parliament put forward similar arguments.34 In 
response to the Catalan authorities’ attempts to ‘Europeanise’ the referendum process, the 
Spanish Foreign Ministry also intensified contacts with other Member States and with the EU 
institutions to explain the Spanish Government’s position and request their support in dealing 
with what they defined as an internal constitutional issue.35 As a result, the European Member 
States and EU institutions received pressure to intervene from both sides of the conflict, each 
asserting their respective positions to be a more faithful understanding of the European project.  
The EU was also a central focus of the 2014 independence referendum campaign in Scotland 
ahead of the September vote. Since the 1990s the Scottish nationalist movement had 
campaigned under the banner ‘Independence in Europe’, to position the Scottish independence 
movement as one which was cosmopolitan in outlook and hence fully engaged with the new 
supra-national realities of the continent. It is notable that a central part of the debate was 
citizenship. The Scottish Government saw a direct and salient link between citizenship in an 
independent Scotland and EU citizenship. The Scottish Independence Bill which set out the 
Scottish Government’s plans for an interim constitution to take effect upon independence in 
March 2016 reasserted Scotland’s commitment to the EU, its law and the notion of European 
citizenship.36 The Bill sought to link Scottish citizenship to EU citizenship in the period after 
independence, meaning EU citizenship rights would be engaged, at least in Scots law, upon 
‘independence day’ under the provisions of the Bill.37 Of course, this in itself would not have 
secured EU citizenship if Scotland was not a Member State at this point. But even if the 
accession of Scotland as a Member State had not been concluded, there would be a domestic 
template in place to allow EU citizenship rights to continue for Scottish citizens in an 
independent Scotland either by their holding dual nationality (if UK citizenship had not been 
removed from Scottish citizens at that point), or by virtue of the provisional effect of any draft 
accession treaty that could possibly have been activated in EU law in the interim period before 
formal accession of Scotland as a new Member State.38 
The very fact that the interim constitution which would have founded Scottish self-government 
set out to define citizenship in avowedly European terms highlights the extent to which EU 
                                                          
34 J. Weiler, ‘Catalonian Independence and the European Union’, European Journal of International Law Blog, 
20 December 2012, www.ejiltalk.org/catalonian-independence-and-the-european-union/, visited 3 November 
2017 C. Alvarez de Toledo, ‘Europe cannot afford to give in to the separatists’, FT.com,  
www.ft.com/content/bf93a536-988a-11e3-8503-00144feab7de, visited 3 November 2017. Contra these positions 
see N. Walker, ‘Hijacking the Debate’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (18th February 2014) (available at: 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/). 
35 ‘Margallo convoca a los embajadores de los países de la UE acreditados en Madrid en plena ofensiva para frenar 
el soberanismo’ [Margallo meets the ambassadors from EU countries based in Madrid in full attack to stop the 
sovereigntist movement] La Vanguardia, 19 September 2013, 
www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20130919/54387754857/margallo-convoca-embajadores-ue-madrid.html, 
visited 3 November 2017. 
36 ‘The Scottish Independence Bill’ s24, contained in The Scottish Government, ‘The Scottish Independence Bill, 
A Consultation on an Interim Constitution for Scotland’, 16 June, 2014.  
37 ‘The Scottish Independence Bill’ s18. 
38 S. Tierney and K. Boyle, ‘An Independent Scotland: The Road to Membership of the European Union’, ESRC 
Scottish Centre on Constitutional Change, Briefing Paper: 20 August 2014, 
http://www.centreonconstitutionalchange.ac.uk/publications/research-briefings/independent-scotland-road-
membership-european-union , visited 3 November 2017. 
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membership was woven into the independence campaign and how much the Scottish nationalist 
notion of the Scottish demos focused upon Scots as part of a wider EU body of citizens. In this 
respect the notion of nationalism reviving below the level of the state needs to be contextualised 
by the fact that in both Scotland and Catalonia, at least at the elite level, the vernacular national 
identity was being put forward as very much a mixed identity which shared the EU vision of 
an integrating European demotic space. In this way both processes brought the wider European 
Union and its citizens into the referendum conversation at least as interlocutors and potentially, 
in a longer-term sense, as part of a wider determining demos. 
As in the case of referendums in relation to the EU integration process, therefore, in these 
domestic referendums a tension arises. Are they to be understood as instruments that contribute 
to multilevel deliberation and decision-making in a developing EU constitutional framework, 
or are they simply vehicles to articulate and empower resilient national identities in a state-
based system?  
In the end something of a paradox is at work. The European Union faces a series of crises 
concerning the coherence of its integrationist project: Euroscepticism, financial crisis, 
migration and now also the response to sub-state nationalism. Is it feasible to look for a Union-
wide process of democratisation that will facilitate wide deliberation upon these issues and the 
identification of solutions that are legitimate and sustainable across the EU? As will be further 
confirmed in the following sections, the EU seems to lack the institutional means and the 
political will to foster this type of initiative. Instead, the referendum has emerged in a way that 
seems to be re-nationalising European politics, leading individual territories to reassert their 
national prerogatives and in this way distance themselves further from the very idea of a pan-
EU solution.  
 
II. Referendums, legality and visions of Europe  
The ongoing process of European integration has transformed the EU from an international to 
a constitutional order, with a growing interdependence between the legal orders of the EU and 
its Member States.39 Indeed, references to the EU as a form of multilevel and/or plurinational 
federation are now commonplace. However, this process has not gone uncontested and has 
involved constant struggles over constitutional sovereignty between the EU and its Member 
States. Many of the treaty revision referendums and in particular their outcome, are a reflection 
of these struggles and of the resistance of the citizens of certain Member States to the pace or 
nature of EU integration.40 They also reflect different competing visions about the current state 
and future of the European project, which are also very much present in debates across the 
different Member States today: that of the EU as a developing post-sovereign entity versus that 
of the EU as primarily a union of sovereign states.  
                                                          
39 J. Shaw, ‘The European Union and global constitutionalism’, in A. Lang and A. Wiener (eds.), Handbook on 
Global Constitutionalism (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017); N. Walker, ‘Federalism in 3D: The Reimagination of 
Political Community in the European Union’, Catolica Law Review (2016) pp. 67-90; M. Keating, ‘Europe as a 
multilevel federation’, Journal of European Public Policy, (2017) 24;4, pp. 615-632.  
40 Tierney, supra n.5, p. 156-161.  
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In all three of the main cases considered, despite the fact that the central issue to be decided 
was primarily a domestic one (how to best overcome an austerity crisis in Greece, and the drive 
for independence in Scotland and Catalonia), the decision was also going to have a clear impact 
on the EU legal order. Furthermore, in the three cases, much of the focus of the internal debates 
was on what the consequences of the decision would be, and in particular, the legal 
consequences of the referendum outcome at the EU level. While the decision on the referendum 
question was in the hands of the people of the state or sub-state, the legal consequences at the 
EU level were out of their hands and would be decided by the EU institutions and Member 
States in accordance with their supra-national procedures. Again, there is an interesting contrast 
between the Greek referendum and the Catalan and Scotland referendum processes. 
In the case of Greece, following the withdrawal of the creditors’ proposals, there was concern 
that the referendum was left devoid of any meaning. This ‘vacuum’ generated two competing 
narratives on what the referendum was in fact about. The Greek government stressed that the 
withdrawal of the creditors’ proposals did not upend the need for a referendum. For the Greek 
government, the referendum was an opportunity to receive a renewed mandate to continue the 
contentious talks with creditors on an anti-austerity platform. The arguments employed by the 
‘No’ campaign, focused on the perceived loss of national sovereignty41 with regards to the 
appropriate policies that would guarantee exit from the crisis, a loss that was a consequence of 
Greece’s disadvantaged position at the negotiating table.   
The opposition, aided by commentary by senior EU officials proposed and argued for a 
different interpretation of the referendum question. For the ‘Yes’ campaign, the referendum 
had little to do with the specific bailout conditions included in the creditors’ proposals. Instead, 
in their view, the referendum was an opportunity for Greek voters to provide a clear affirmation 
of continued European economic integration. In pushing this narrative, central to the ‘Yes’ 
campaign was the argument that a ‘No’ vote would jeopardise Greece’s continued participation 
in the Eurozone. In the days leading up to the referendum, authoritative voices across Europe 
underscored the point that the outcome of the referendum was inextricably linked to Greece’s 
future as a member of the Eurozone. French President Hollande stressed that the referendum 
was “about whether the Greeks want to stay in the Eurozone or take the risk of leaving”,42 
while Italy’s Prime Minister Matteo Renzi similarly noted that the referendum “was not a 
question of the Commission versus Tsipras” but of “the euro versus the drachma. This is the 
choice”.43 A key initiative in Greece supporting the ‘Yes’ vote, tellingly named ‘Menoume 
Evropi’ (We Remain in Europe),44 highlighted the European dimension of the referendum 
                                                          
41 Triga Manavopoulos, supra n 11, p 135.  
42 L. Elliott et al, ‘Europe's big guns warn Greek voters that a no vote means euro exit’, The Guardian, 30 June 
2015,  www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/29/greek-crisis-referendum-eurozone-vote-germany-france-
italy , visited 3 November 2017. 
43 L. Elliott et al, ‘Europe's big guns warn Greek voters that a no vote means euro exit’, The Guardian, 30 June 
2015,  www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/29/greek-crisis-referendum-eurozone-vote-germany-france-
italy , visited 3 November 2017. 
44 Y. Palaiologos, ‘Will Greece’s Government fall?’, Politico.com, 7 March 2015, www.politico.eu/article/will-
greeces-government-fall/ ,  visited 3 November 2017. 
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stressing the economic hardships that would inevitably follow a ‘No’ vote, while also extoling 
the benefits of continued EU participation.45 
On the other hand, in the cases of both Catalonia and Scotland, the referendum processes were 
both framed within an understanding of the EU as something more than a union of states. In 
this sense, both processes were designed to maximise the possibilities offered by the integration 
of the legal orders of the EU and its Member States in relation to the legal aspects of a sub-
state independence referendum and its consequences. Their basic premise was that these were 
not matters to be resolved taking into consideration the domestic legal order and the position 
of the national authorities alone, and that the European framework offered better options for 
the sub-state units than those presented by their corresponding state. By contrast, it was the 
affected Member States, the UK and Spain, that were defending classical and exclusive forms 
of state sovereignty to the effect that all matters resulting from the referendum processes should 
be addressed and resolved within the domestic constitutional framework, which the EU legal 
framework should then respect and follow.  
The Catalan referendum process raised questions regarding its legality at both the state and 
European level. At the state level, together with the questions regarding the demos, the central 
issue was whether the Catalan institutions of self-government had the competence to legislate 
for an independence referendum or analogous consultation process.46 The Spanish authorities 
argued that they did not and challenged any measures to this end before the Constitutional 
Court, whose decisions ultimately supported their position. This led to the escalation of the 
conflict, with the Catalan institutions proceeding with the 2017 referendum in open defiance 
of the Court’s rulings. The Spanish authorities then justified their severe response on the basis 
that the referendum was clearly unconstitutional, and that the Catalan institutions had to return 
to the sphere of legality.47    
At the European level, the debate on the legality focused on whether, and if so, how, an 
independent Catalonia could remain part of the European Union. The Catalan Government 
published an expert report that highlighted that the EU had traditionally taken a flexible and 
pragmatic approach in finding solutions to unforeseen problems arising in relation to changes 
in the territorial organisation of the Member States.48 On this basis, the report concluded that 
the most persuasive options for both the EU and its Member States would be either Catalonia 
remaining in the EU after independence, or its rapid accession after a transitional regime.49 The 
Spanish Government, on the other hand, argued that a newly independent Catalonia would be 
automatically excluded from the EU and would have to reapply as a third country. It published 
its own report where it stated that EU law was ‘explicit, clear and conclusive’ in this sense in 
                                                          
45 Triga and Manavopoulos, supra n. 11, p. 132. 
46   Institut d’Estudis Autonomics (2013), ‘Informe sobre els procediments legals  traves desl quals es ciutadans I 
ciutadanes de Catalunya poden ser consultats sobre llur future politic collectiu’, http://collectiupraga.cat/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Informe-consultes-IEA-11.03.2013.pdf , visited 3 November 2017. 
47 S. Jones, ‘Catalonia weighs up declaration of independence’ The Guardian, 22 October 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/spain-calls-on-catalans-to-respect-decision-to-impose-direct-
rule , visited 3 November 2017. 
48 Government of Catalonia, (2014) ‘Paths for Catalonia’s integration in the European Union’.  
49 Government of Catalonia, (2014) ‘Paths for Catalonia’s integration in the European Union’. 
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relation to a unilateral declaration of independence. It based its position on the EU’s obligation 
to respect the national identities of the Member States and their essential State functions, 
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State (Article 4(2) TEU).50 In the months 
leading up to the 2017 vote, the Spanish Government also stressed that the rule of law was one 
of the fundamental values of the European Union, and that a referendum held in violation of 
the Spanish Constitution would be in violation of the EU legal framework and values, and 
should therefore not receive any EU recognition or support.51   
The main contrast between the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and the ongoing 
Catalan debate is that the legality of the Scottish process was not in question. In 2012 the 
Scottish and UK Governments arrived at the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’, the terms of which 
provided that the two governments would work together in the best interests of the people of 
Scotland and of the rest of the UK following the referendum.52 On that basis, the Scottish 
Parliament was empowered by the UK Parliament to pass legislation framing the franchise, the 
date of the referendum, the question and the funding and spending rules.53  
The issue of EU membership did however remain contentious. The Edinburgh Agreement did 
not expressly commit the UK Government to helping facilitate Scotland’s membership, but it 
was widely viewed that the mutual interests of both peoples would be best served by Scotland’s 
membership of the EU. This still left open a debate as to how this might happen. It is no surprise 
that in the course of the campaign a major point of dispute concerned the relative ease or 
difficulty with which an independent Scotland would be able to accede to the EU.54 
It was the intention of the Scottish National Party Government in Scotland55 that, were it 
successful in winning a Yes vote on 18 September 2014, negotiations would begin to bring 
about an agreement with the UK Government as to the terms of Scottish independence, leading 
to a declaration of independence in March 2016.56 The Scottish Government intended that 
negotiations would take place simultaneously with the European Union during this interim 
period to bring about Scottish membership of the EU on the same date as independence from 
the UK is achieved.57  
                                                          
50 Gobierno de Espana, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperacion, (2014) ‘Cataluna en Espana. Por la  
convivencia democratica’.  
51 J. Casqueiro, ‘Rajoy sobre Cataluna: ‘’La alternativa a cumplir la ley es nada, por no decir la selva’ [Rajoy on 
Catalonia: ‘‘The alternative to complying with the law is nothing, not to say the jungle]’, El Pais, 26 March 2017,  
https://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/03/25/actualidad/1490441745_594333.html visited 3 November 2017. 
52 ‘Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland’, 15 October 2012, para 30. 
53 Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013; Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013. 
54 S. Tierney, ‘Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for Scotland’, 9 EuConst (2013) 359-
390. 
55 The Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s Future’, Scotland.gov.uk, 26 November 2013, 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348, Part 4 ‘Transition’, p.338, also p.51-52 visited 3 
November 2017. 
56 Scotland’s Future, supra n. 55, p. 20, 51, 338. 
57 ‘In the period between a vote for independence on 18 September 2014 and independence day on 24 March 2016 
agreements will be reached with the rest of the UK, represented by the Westminster Government, and with the 
EU and other international partners and organisations’. Scotland’s Future, supra n. 55, p.338, See also: ‘The UK 
and Scottish Governments, along with the EU institutions and Member States, will have a shared interest in 
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But it was clear that for the main Yes campaign, as with Catalan nationalists, the strategy was 
for an independent Scotland to find itself in early course within the EU. Indeed, there were 
those who attempted to argue that Scotland would gain easy accession to the EU, or that it 
would in fact ‘remain’ in the EU by way of a seamless transition. Aidan O’Neill for example 
argued that the CJEU might be expected to intervene to ensure that Scotland would in fact 
succeed to membership of the EU automatically on the basis of citizenship rights.58 In both 
Scotland and Catalonia, the attempt to co-opt the cooperation of the EU in independence plans 
was of course an attempt to persuade them as to the lawful credentials of these processes, but 
more than this it was an effort to put forward both territories as good European nations who 
would bring to the EU full compliance with the law and spirit of the EU as well as bodies of 
citizens already steeped in the European process of integration. 
In all three cases, the wider consequences of the decision subject to a referendum would 
necessarily involve a legal response at the EU level which, because of its significance, had the 
potential to significantly influence the outcome of the national vote and therefore of the 
Member State’s (or sub-state unit’s) sovereign decision-making. This would seem to confirm 
a high level of integration and of constitutionalisation within the EU system, where even the 
answer to domestic constitutional matters subject to referendum will involve a coordinated 
response across the national and supra-national levels of government. However, we have also 
seen that in these cases the formation of a separate EU-wide position on the issue to be decided 
was not necessarily requested or supported by the affected Member State. In these domestic 
referendums, therefore, the tension over constitutional sovereignty between the EU and its 
Member States and between competing visions of Europe also arises, putting the role and 
intervention of the EU institutions and representatives in these processes clearly in the 
spotlight. While a more federal understanding of the EU would seem to require a coherent EU 
based legal response to these questions, a more state-centred one would favour the EU showing 
deference to the legal position of the Member State(s) involved. Furthermore, because these 
were essentially domestic referendums, the dangers of Member State resistance and of EU 
actions being perceived as an excessive or unjustified encroachment on national sovereignty in 
a context of existing Euroscepticism were highly significant political factors in informing 
decisions about the extent to which the EU ought to be involved.    
Just as referendums assert the resilience of national demoi therefore, the logical next step is for 
them also to become vehicles through which national sovereignty itself comes to be reclaimed. 
 
III. EU’s entanglement in domestic direct democracy  
In a number of treaty-revision referendums, for example in relation to the Treaty of Nice, the 
draft Constitutional Treaty or the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU itself has a history of intervening in 
                                                          
working together to conclude these negotiations to transfer Scotland’s EU membership from membership as part 
of the UK to membership as an independent Member State.’ Scotland’s Future, supra n. 55, p.53. 
58 A. O’Neill, ‘A Quarrel in a Faraway Country?: Scotland, Independence and the EU’, Eutopia Law Blog, 14 
November 2011, http://eutopialaw.com/2011/11/14/685/ , visited 3 November 2017. 
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the referendum process, supporting the campaign for pro-integration votes.59 This is largely 
unsurprising, as the decisions concerned an EU-wide issue, would have an EU-wide impact 
and, as has been seen, there was no possibility for the EU to hold its own referendums on 
ratification. However, it can also be seen as an interference in a Member State’s domestic 
affairs and even, taking into consideration the EU’s democratic legitimacy problems, an 
illegimate attempt to subvert the exercise of direct democracy. More controversially, the EU 
has also intervened after negative votes in referendums, showing an unwillingness to accept 
the outcome as an obstacle to further integration.60  
The story of intervention is much more nuanced and complex in the three central cases we have 
considered. In particular, we see a significant contrast between the EU’s intervention in the 
Greek referendum on the one hand and its approach to the Scottish referendum and Catalan 
referendum processes on the other. The most fervent intervention was reserved for the Greek 
case. EU leaders and representatives of EU institutions unequivocally lent their support to the 
arguments that a victory of a ‘No’ vote would provide an even more painful alternative to 
austerity. Juncker, was particularly unambiguous in guiding Greek voters as to the preferred 
referendum outcome. As he stressed: 
I will be asking the Greek people to vote ‘yes’, regardless of the question that is 
ultimately put to them. Indeed, the question may change over the next few days 
[…] You have to vote ‘yes’, whatever the question put to you. The rest of Europe, 
the people of Europe do not know what this question will be. You have to vote 
‘yes’, whatever the question because responsible, honourable Greek citizens, who 
are justly proud of themselves and their country, must say ‘yes’ to Europe”.61 
A parallel can be drawn with its approach to referendums on Nice, Lisbon etc. It seems clear 
that when the referendum is concerned directly with an EU treaty or EU policy the EU does 
not consider the referendum to be a domestic matter. In the Scottish referendum and the Catalan 
process, however, the EU institutions took a step back and largely refrained from intervening, 
declaring that this was an ‘internal constitutional issue’. Furthermore, when they did make 
some comments regarding both processes, their positions seemed to defer to the constitutional 
and political preferences of the affected Member States (more permissive in relation to 
Scotland, more restrictive in the case of Catalonia), and to the collective concerns across the 
existing Member States that this would lead to further sub-state independence movements. 
Therefore, despite these processes also potentially having a significant EU impact in the case 
of a Yes vote, involving as they did territories who aspired to full membership of the Union as 
Member States, the EU representatives seemed unwilling, or unable (due to the strong positions 
of its existing Member States) to provide a united response based on the principles of EU law.  
The European Union’s responses to the claims and requests coming from Catalonia focused 
consistently on sending out two messages. The first was that the conflicts between the Spanish 
and Catalan authorities over the holding of the referendum were an internal constitutional issue, 
                                                          
59 Tierney, supra n. 5, p. 161-163. 
60 Tierney, supra n. 5, 165.  
61 Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker's press conference, on Greece, supra n. 15. 
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and that therefore the EU remained neutral and would not intervene. For example, in 2013 the 
president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, thanked the Catalan President 
for his letter, but added that he would make no comments “on a question of internal 
organisation related to the constitutional arrangements in the Member States”62. Similar 
positions were put forward by other representatives throughout the process. The second 
message was more controversial. Despite claiming that the EU remained neutral on the conflict, 
various representatives of different EU institutions did intervene on the issue of whether a 
newly independent Catalonia could remain in the EU. For example, in response to a question 
posed by a Catalan MEP, Jose Manuel Barroso stated that “a new independent state would, by 
the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the EU and the Treaties 
would no longer apply on its territory”.63 Other EU representatives also repeated different 
versions of this statement.  
These messages showed clearly that the EU and its Member States were not going to assume 
the role of intermediaries in the conflict, as the Catalan authorities were requesting. This was 
confirmed when they refused to intervene even after the Spanish authorities used force to try 
to block the 2017 referendum, and then suspended Catalan self-government and imprisoned its 
main political leaders.64 Furthermore, these messages also bolstered the position and arguments 
of the Spanish Government, highlighting a clear EU position against internal secession for 
reasons of democratic choice. In this sense, for example, various quotes from Barroso and Prodi 
were included in the Spanish Government’s report to support its position on the impossibility 
of an independent Catalonia remaining in the EU.65 In the months leading up to the 2017 
referendum, and as the conflict escalated, the EU’s support for the Spanish state’s position 
became more explicit, with several of its representatives stressing the need to respect the 
Spanish constitutional framework and the rule of law.66     
The EU’s position on the Catalan referendum process (which was to some extent mirrored in 
its similar scepticism for the much less controversial independence referendum in Scotland) 
has been criticised on two grounds. Firstly, for not intervening to protect the rights of Catalan 
                                                          
62 Fores, L. (2014), ‘Barroso respon a Mas que no es el rol de Brussel.les pronunciar-se sobre la legalitat de la 
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European citizens when force was used against them during an attempt to exercise their right 
to vote in a referendum, or in response to the repressive measures adopted by the Spanish 
authorities in the weeks that followed it.67 More generally, the EU’s position on internal 
enlargement in the case of the independence of an EU sub-state unit has led to accusations that 
it attempted to hijack the debate on an internal constitutional issue and to inappropriately 
influence the outcome.68 Many scholars have convincingly argued that a democratic secession 
process is fully compatible with the principles and values of the EU, and the sui generis EU 
legal order contains the necessary resources to allow a newly created state to remain part of the 
EU, or to re-join it, without temporarily having to leave.69 In comments made after the 2017 
Catalan referendum, Jean-Claude Juncker highlighted that in this response the EU is protecting 
its own interests, stating that ‘If we allow … that Catalonia becomes independent, others will 
do the same …. I would not like a European Union in 15 years that consists of some 90 states’.70     
In the Scottish referendum, European Union actors tended to refrain from involvement in the 
campaign, although conflicting signals did appear. Former President of the European 
Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, said it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible” for 
an independent Scotland to join the European Union.71 This may well have been with an eye 
to Spain which, concerned about Catalonia, was generally hostile to the notion that a sub-state 
territory could secede from a Member State and gain easy access to the EU. 
On the other hand, Jean-Claude Juncker, who in 2014 had succeeded Mr Barroso as President 
of the Commission, was reportedly “sympathetic” to an independent Scotland joining the EU.72 
Although Mr Juncker has taken the general view that there should be no further enlargement 
until 2019, EU officials in the course of the independence campaign indicated that this ‘ban’ 
on further enlargement did not apply to an application for membership by a newly independent 
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Scotland which would be treated as a ‘special and separate case’ as it already meets ‘core-EU 
requirements’.73 If so, it marks a stark contrast between Juncker’s position on Scotland and that 
in relation to Catalonia, which may demonstrate that issues of political calculation rather than 
principle were driving the response to each process by senior EU actors. 
The Scottish situation fostered an internal debate as we have seen about the relative ease or 
difficulty of joining the EU. But it is interesting how the EU on the one hand felt it better 
generally to keep out of the referendum but in other ways dropped hints based upon perceptions 
of its own self-interest. That it was far less vocal in relation to Scotland is perhaps largely a 
consequence of the different political needs of the Member State concerned. The general 
approach in both cases was of deference to the position of the affected Member States in these 
cases, rather than a clearly developed EU position of principle on these matters.  
Sub-state independence referendums pose a particularly complex challenge for the EU. On the 
one hand, and as has been seen, these processes have been stimulated by the opportunities 
offered by the process of constitutionalisation of the EU, and are notably favourable to the EU 
project, in contrast with a number of other recent examples of referendums to which we 
referred. At the same time, both the Scottish and Catalan processes were carefully framed to 
ensure they were consistent with EU principles and values. From this perspective, it might 
seem that as legitimate exercises in democratic engagement they should be looked on 
sympathetically, rather than rejected out of hand, by the EU. On the other hand, the fact that 
these sub-state units are aiming to establish themselves as full EU Member States can also be 
seen as a failure of the wider multi-level EU constitutionalisation project, which has not 
managed to provide any meaningful voice and representation for sub-state units in the working 
of its institutions and procedures. Resistance to secession at the level of the EU also reflects of 
course the resilience and power of Member States themselves within the European project, 
many of which are concerned that a favourable EU position on these matters would encourage 
their own sub-state national movements to follow suit. This has led the EU adopting a position 
on these matters that Walker has described as one of “conservative neutrality”, which 
ultimately (re) empowers the Member States. 74 
Conclusions 
The article has attempted to examine the challenges posed to European integration by exercises 
of direct democracy at the national or sub-state level. We have tracked how the interplay 
between the national-constitutional and EU level has affected our understanding of the demos 
question. Appeals to either the national or European identities of the voters were crucial to both 
sides of the referendum campaign in Greece, with the EU openly asking voters to participate 
in the referendum as members of the broader EU family. Conversely, in the Scottish and 
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Catalan referendums, EU citizenship and the concept of a European demos was underplayed 
by the EU which treated these referendums as an internal constitutional matter. In all three of 
the referendums, the result would necessarily require a legal response at the EU level. For 
Greece the key issue was whether a ‘No’ outcome would pave the way for a ‘Grexit’ from the 
Eurozone, while in Scotland and Catalonia the debate centred around whether they would be 
able to re-join (or remain in) the EU as independent state entities. The fact that EU matters 
were at stake in all three referendums, led us to further examine how the EU intervened in the 
referendum process. While the EU took a hard-line approach in the Greek referendum, its 
presence was more discreet in the sub-state referendums. But nonetheless it did enough to 
demonstrate scepticism with the Scottish process and strong discouragement of the referendum 
in Catalonia.  
The European Union is beset by problems both internally and externally. After a rapid process 
of expansion it is now focused upon further integration as a solution to these problems. It is 
clear however that it has no clear strategy for a process of centralisation that can cope with the 
resilience of state nationalism and the complex pluralisation of identities below the level of the 
state and the forms of popular resistance to its austerity regime that are increasingly emerging. 
The referendum as a proliferating form of vernacular popular engagement has served to expose 
these problems and may in time come to frustrate the European project’s wider ambitions.   
 
 
